Florida Law Review
Volume 16

Issue 3

Article 5

December 1963

The Effect of Common Law Rights of Parents on Adoption in
Florida
Clyde A. Reese Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Clyde A. Reese Jr., The Effect of Common Law Rights of Parents on Adoption in Florida, 16 Fla. L. Rev.
452 (1963).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

[Vol. XV1in Florida
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW of
REVIEW
Reese: The
Effect of Common
Law Rights
Parents on Adoption

THE EFFECT OF COMMON LAW BIGHTS OF
PARENTS ON ADOPTION IN FLORIDA
A parent has the common law duty to support, educate, and
protect his child, and a corresponding right to the custody and control
over him. At the same time, the state stands in the position of
parens patriae, and thus has an overriding interest in the welfare of
any child. The state may assume the control and custody of the
child if the well-being of the child demands it, and the rights of the
parents may be limited as policy dictates.' The ultimate interference
with the parent's common law rights is manifested by the statutory
privilege of adoption. These rights may be relinquished by consent
of the natural parents to adoption; on the other hand, the parents
may forfeit their rights, as a result of neglect of their duties, through
proceedings terminating in involuntary adoption. Adoption is the
creation of the legal relationship of parent and child between persons
not so related by blood. There is no common law adoption, so it is
2
available only by state statutes in the United States.
Legal adoption must be distinguished from the common law right
of third parties to legal custody of the child. Whereas an adoption
decree is permanent and irrevocable, custody decrees are not final,
and may be modified if later circumstances warrant.3 As a result,
the trial court may exercise more discretion in awarding custody than
it could if the proceeding were for adoption.4 The Florida court has
stressed that what might appear to be the best interests of the child
in determining temporary or even prolonged custody will not necessarily support a decree of adoption. 5
EARLY ADomoN LAws IN FLoRmA

The first Florida statute permitting adoption of minor children was
enacted in 1885.6 Prior to this act adoption was possible only through
special legislation. The early statute was extremely brief, providing
only the barest outline of the procedure to be followed. Full power
to legalize the adoption of any child by any person was given to the
circuit judges. There was no requirement of the consent of the natural
parents to the adoption; the requisite notice was merely newspaper
7
publication for four weeks in the petitioner's county of domicile.
1. 67 c.J.S. Parentand Child §10 (1950).
2. 2 Am. JuR. 2D Adoption §2 (1962).
3. Little v. Franklin, 40 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949).
4. Bouchard v. Bouchard, 119 So. 2d 819 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
5. Wiggins v. Rolls, 100 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 1958).

6. Fla. Laws 1885, ch. 3594.
7. Fla. Laws 1885, ch. 3594, §2.
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Thd rarity of adoption in Florida until comparatively recent years is
evidenced by the fact that the first adoption case involving a minor
did not reach the Florida Supreme Court until 1937.8
The supreme court utilized the next adoption case on appeal to
render a substantial judicial construction of the existing law, on the
basis of the belief that the statute failed to protect the common law
rights of the parent. In In re Whetstone,9 the natural mother contended that the adoption was void because it was granted without
her knowledge or consent and without giving her notice or opportunity
to be heard. The court ruled that an adoption statute may constitutionally authorize the adoption of children only (1) with the consent
of the natural parents, or (2) in the event the child has been abandoned by its natural parents, or (3) if the parents have already been
permanently deprived of the custody of the child because of a court
proceeding, or (4) if the parents have notice of the adoption proceedings rendering a revocation of custody in the best interests of the
child.
Florida adoption procedure was further amplified to protect the
rights of the natural parents by Fielding v. Highsmith.O In this case
the father's consent had not been obtained and he had not received
notice of the adoption proceedings. Upon discovering the adoption,
he initiated habeas corpus proceedings to regain custody of his child.
The trial court made no express holding concerning the validity or
invalidity of the adoption, but merely declared the father to be a fit
parent and awarded custody to him on that ground. On appeal, the
supreme court considered this custody award tantamount to annulling the adoption. The court affirmed the nullity of the adoption
decree, but decided that the best interests of the child could be
served only by restoring temporary custody of the child to the adoptive parents. It stated that the moral, intellectual, and material welfare of the child is the matter of chief importance, and therefore the
child should be placed where this interest is best served, without
regard to the validity or invalidity of the adoption proceedings. Although the court purported to do no more than restate the principles
of the earlier Whetstone case, in actuality it extended considerably
the constitutional guarantees granted earlier to natural parents. The
court in Fielding declared that in addition to notice to the parents,
there was also a requirement that the natural parents be given an
opportunity to be 'heard. Notice was required even in the case of
abandonment unless the whereabouts of the parents could not be
8. In re Adoption of Palmer, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (1937).
9. 137 Fla. 712, 188 So. 576 (1939).
10. 152 Fla. 837, 13 So. 2d 208 (1943).
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determined. If the parents were deprived of their custody prior to
the initiation of adoption proceedings, such action must have been
taken by a competent court having jurisdiction over both the parents
and the child. The appellate court refused to terminate the common
law rights of the father since the lack of notice had denied him
procedural due process. The court's decision is rather puzzling because it would appear that the welfare of the child would have
dictated upholding the adoption. The protection of the father's
rights was seemingly deemed paramount at this time by the court,
regardless of the child welfare language used in the decision.
PRESENT STATTrORY PROVISIONS

The 1943 legislature repealed in toto the existing statute, and
enacted the comprehensive adoption law now constituting chapter
72 of the Florida Statutes. 1 ' A significant improvement in the present
statute 12 is the codification of those procedural safeguards for the
rights of the natural parents enumerated by the court in the Fielding
case. The Florida adoption statute provides for both voluntary and
involuntary termination of the parental rights. For voluntary relinquishment, the natural parents or the mother of an illegitimate child
must file a written consent to the adoption, signed in the presence of
two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary public or other
appropriate official. In order to obtain a valid involuntary termination
of these rights by the court, there must be either personal service of
notice on the natural parents, or newspaper publication of notice for
four consecutive weeks in the county in which the petition for adoption has been filed. A further duty is imposed on a petitioner for
adoption if notice by publication is to be accepted; the petitioner
must show on the petition that a diligent search has been made to
13
ascertain the names and place of residence of the natural parents.
ThE Co _cr BTwEE ADOPTION AND Tm COMMON LAw
In common law states, adoption statutes represent the ultimate
derogation of the common law rights of parents to the custody and
direction of their offspring, and for that reason should be strictly
construed. Many jurisdictions take the view, however, that since the
adoption statutes are remedial and tend to preserve the best interests
of society, they deserve a liberal construction. 14 In Florida, the
11. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 21759.
12. FLA. STAT.ch. 72 (1961).
13. FL&. STAT. §72.13 (1961).

14. E.g., Cofer v. Scroggins, 98 Ala. 342, 13 So. 115 (1893); Blaustein v.
Blaustein, 77 Ohio App. 281, 66 N.E.2d 156 (1946); Parsons v. Parsons, 101 Wis.
76, 77 N.W. 147 (1898).
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chancellor has the burden of reconciling the common law interests
of the parents and the interest of the state in the welfare of the
child, should they conflict. If, after the appropriate hearing, he is
convinced that the prospective adoptive parents are suitable persons
and that the child's best interests will be served by the adoption, the
statute directs him to grant a final decree of adoption.15
What are the circumstances that the court considers sufficient to
justify involuntary termination of the common law rights of the natural parents? A study of cases appealed to the Florida courts indicates
that natural parents have been deprived of such rights without their
actual consent in only three general situations: (1) if the parent
is held to have given his constructive consent to the adoption; (2)
if he is found by the court to be an unfit parent to retain custody;
or, (3) if he is found to have abandoned the child.
Constructive Consent by the Natural Parents
One basis for the involuntary termination of parental rights has
resulted from the courts' apparent adherence to a notion that constructive consent may be sufficient to validate an adoption proceeding.
According to this doctrine, substantial compliance with the statutory
provisions for consent of the natural parents will suffice in certain
cases to terminate the parental rights.' 6
The notion of constructive consent was developed in the case of
Pugh v. Barwick.17 A nineteen-year old unwed mother had written
a letter to recent acquaintances explaining that because she had no
place to stay, she would allow them to adopt her young son. Approximately a year after the couple had taken custody of the child,
the mother and her new husband sought to regain custody of the
child. The couple having custody immediately applied to the circuit
court for voluntary adoption on the basis of the letter written to
them by the mother. On appeal from a decree granting the adoption,
the Florida Supreme Court held that the letter, coupled with actual
delivery of custody of the child to the strangers, "may in this particular instance be sufficient to meet the requirements of our adoption
statutes.'1 8 The statutory requirement for a valid consent to adoption
is that the consent be in writing, executed before two witnesses, and
acknowledged before a notary public. 19
Although the Barwick holding has never been overruled, neither
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

FiA. STAT.

§72.20 (1961).

In re Gaban, 158 Fla. 597, 599, 80 So. 2d 176, 177 (1947).
56 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1952).
Id. at 126.
FiA. STAT. §72.14 (1961).
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has it been followed by the lower appellate courts. In the 1961 case
of McKinney v. Weeks 20 the Second District Court of Appeal held
that a consent instrument witnessed by only one person was invalid.
The court distinguished the Barwick holding by limiting it to the
"particular instance" involved. The inconsistency of validating a
consent instrument executed with no witnesses but invalidating a
21
consent instrument with one witness is too clear to require stress.
The court noted in the Barwick holding that it was charged with
the responsibility of issuing only such orders as would reasonably be
calculated to promote the welfare of the child. One commentator
has suggested that the adoption may have been allowed on this ground
despite the statutory insufficiency of the consent.22 Such a conclusion seems unwarranted, however, since the court found affirmatively
that there was ample evidence that the mother and her husband
were "fine young people and maintain a home . . . where each is
highly respected." 23 Thus, the meaning and present status of the
Barwick holding remains in considerable doubt. Whether the court
will continue to recognize some notion of constructive consent as the
result of prolonged acquiescence by the parent remains to be seen.
Unfitness of the Natural Parents
A second finding often applied by the trial courts in granting
adoption over the objections of the natural parents is that they are
unfit to retain custody. The Florida Supreme Court carefully ex24
amined this ground in the 1957 case of Torres v. Van Eepoel.
The natural father of the two children involved was killed in an auto
crash when they were quite young. Four years later the mother
went out of town, leaving the children with a baby sitter. The children were put in the custody of a paternal aunt who in turn petitioned
for adoption six weeks later. The chancellor granted the adoption
because of the mother's demonstrated irresponsibility and indifference
to the welfare of the children, which, though concededly not enough
in itself to justify adoption, was buttressed by evidence of her intimate association with men "indicating to some extent that her conduct was subject to criticism and perhaps suspicion of immorality."2The determining factor in the chancellor's opinion was that the
mother had been dating a married man. The Florida Supreme Court,
in upsetting the adoption decree, declared that the natural parent
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

130 So. 2d 310 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
See Murray, Family Law, 16 U. M.AMn L. REv. 177, 203 (1961).
24 A.L.R.2d 1127, 1134 (1952).
Pugh v. Barwick, 56 So. 2d 124, 126 (Fla. 1952).
98 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 737.
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has an inherent right to the custody of his children, absent conduct
or conditions justifying a revocation of the right in the interest of the
welfare of the children. The court insisted that, in order to permanently deprive a parent of the custody of his offspring, the evidence
must be clear and convincing that the welfare of the child is in fact
in jeopardy.
The Second District Court of Appeal has also reversed an involuntary adoption decree granted on the basis of parental unfitness
in the case of In re De Walt's Adoption.2 6 The natural parents were
divorced, and custody of the child had been awarded to the mother.
Approximately four months later, the circuit court reversed the custody
award from the mother to the father, determining the mother to be
unfit. The father was subsequently killed in an accident, and the
paternal grandparents petitioned for adoption. The chancellor
granted a final decree of adoption over the strong protest of the
mother. The evidence of unfitness before the trial court was the
earlier holding in the divorce proceeding that the mother was unfit
for' custody, and an adverse report of the welfare board finding the
mother to be unfit. The mother appealed from the adoption decree
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to permanently deprive her of the custody of her child. The appellate court reversed
the adoption decree and directed the chancellor to take further independent testimony to determine the fitness or unfitness of the mother.
The fact that the custody order in the divorce proceeding had been
taken two years before the adoption, and that the welfare board's
report was based on an ex parte investigation in which none of the
parties testified before the court, nor subjected themselves to cross
examination by the mother, was particularly disturbing to the appellate court.
Child Abandonment by the Parents
A third situation in which the courts have been willing to grant
adoption without the consent of the natural parents is that of abandonment of the child. The Florida court has defined abandonment
as that conduct manifesting "a settled purpose to permanently forego
all parental rights and the shirking of the responsibilities cast by law
and nature so as to relinquish all parental claims to the child."27 This
usually involves an aggravated neglect of parental duties and the
delegation of these duties to strangers. Even under rather extreme
circumstances, however, the courts remain reluctant to sever irrevocably the parental rights by granting adoption to a third party.
26. 101 So. 2d 915 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
27. In re Adoption of Prangley, 122 So. 2d 423, 428 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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In the case of Roy v. Holmes,28 the parents gave the custody of
their ten-month old son to acquaintances for two weeks while they
both underwent emergency hospitalization. After more than six
months had passed, the couple having custody wanted to formally
adopt the child, but the natural parents refused to grant permission.
The natural parents agreed to allow the foster parents to keep the
child indefinitely, and further agreed to contribute to his support as
much as they could. When the anticipated contributions were not
received, the foster parents secured an order from the juvenile court
awarding them temporary legal custody and ordering the father to
make payments of ten dollars per week. The support order was
entirely disregarded over subsequent years. At the time the foster
parents petitioned the court for adoption, the child had lived with
them for four years. The State Welfare Board found the child well
adjusted to the foster home and recommended the adoption. The
chancellor granted the adoption on the grounds that the natural
parents had "effectively abandoned" the child, and that it would be
contrary to his best interests to remove him from the foster home and
put him back into an unfamiliar environment. Notwithstanding this,
the appellate court struck down the adoption. Although agreeing
with the chancellor that a period of painful readjustment for the
child would be necessary, the court felt that in the long run the
child's best interest would be served by returning him to the home
of his natural parents. The appellate court reiterated the law's concern for the welfare of the child and acknowledged that in certain
instances such welfare will be given priority over the natural rights
of the parents. However, the court held that, unless there are "clear,
convincing, and compelling" reasons to the contrary, it must be
presumed that his welfare will best be served by remaining with the
natural parents.
A far more ticklish dilemma is faced by the courts if the natural
parents are divorced and a step-parent petitions the court for adoption. If adoption is granted in such cases, it is usually allowed on
the theory that the divorced parent had abandoned the child and
thereby forfeited any parental rights he may have otherwise had.
Steets v. Gammarino29 is the leading case permitting involuntary
adoption on this ground. The father divorced the mother when the
child was about one year old, and the mother received custody of the
child. The mother subsequently remarried, and the second husband
petitioned for formal adoption when the child was about six years
old. The natural father had seen his child only one time since the
28. 111 So. 2d 468 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
29. 59 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1952).
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divorce and then only for several minutes. He had contributed
nothing to the child's support and had shown no other interest in him.
The father objected to the adoption, however, and refused to give
the necessary consent. The chancellor did not find sufficient reason
to override the common law parental rights and denied the stepfather's petition for adoption. The stepfather appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court, which ruled that the adoption should have been
permitted. The court contrasted the indifference of the natural father
to the welfare of his child with the good care provided by the stepfather. It found that the father's nonperformance of his natural and
legal obligation to support the child constituted abandonment. In
discussing the factors favoring the stepfather, the court said that the
stepfather "is conscious of the intangibles, affection, love, fatherly
guidance, the [child's] feeling of being wanted, its importance as a
social unit and the fact that these must be mingled with bread and
butter if the child is not to become maladjusted and a liability instead
of an asset to society." 30 The holding of this case has been limited
to its facts by the Florida Supreme Court, which is still quite conscious of the older common law rights of parents.
The case of Wiggins v. Rofls31 represents the usual result when
the divorced parent objects to the adoption of his children by the
step-parent. In this case the parents were divorced when their daughter was about six years old. The mother received custody, and remarried some seven months later. When the stepfather petitioned for
adoption, the mother testified that adoption was in the child's best
interest because the child became nervous on visits with her natural
father. The natural father opposed the adoption, and showed that
he had made weeldy contributions to the support of the child, had
written to her regularly, and had spent his vacations with her every
summer. The chancellor granted the adoption to the stepfather on
the ground that the child's welfare demanded it. The Florida Supreme Court did not agree, finding no elements of abandonment comparable to those in the Steets case.32 The court noted that, although
the natural father could not maintain the usual family relationship
between father and daughter, he had certainly maintained as close
contact with his daughter as the circumstances of divorce and subsequent remarriages of both him and his former wife would permit.
Florida courts have indicated that failure of the father to contribute
to the support of his child will not by itself constitute abandonment
in all circumstances. In the case of In re Adoption of Prangley,33 the
30.
31.
32.
33.

Steets v. Gammarino, 59 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1952).
100 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1958).
Steets v. Gammarino, 59 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1952).
122 So. 2d 423 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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mother was independently wealthy, and agreed prior to the divorce
to support the child. She was awarded custody, and the father was
granted permission to have the child stay with him in his home for
three weeks of each summer, a privilege which he exercised. Six
years after the divorce the mother wrote her former husband that
the child would not be allowed to continue to visit him until he began
making regular support contributions. Two years later the stepfather
petitioned for legal adoption of the child. The chancellor did not
expressly find that the natural father had abandoned his daughter,
but did observe that the facts were like those in Steets v. Gammarino,
indicating that the father's failure to support was sufficient to justify
adoption on the basis of the Steets rationale.3 4 The appellate court
reversed the adoption decree, pointing out that adoption should never
be permitted unless the parent has in some manner abandoned his
child or otherwise demonstrated that he is not a fit person to continue
to enjoy the privileges and responsibilities of parenthood. The court
distinguished the facts in Steets since the father in that case had
contributed nothing to the support of the child, and had never shown
the slightest interest in the child until the adoption suit was filed. On
the other hand, the court felt that the voluntary support agreement,
signed by the wealthy mother in this case, coupled with the fact that
the father had shown great interest in maintaining a father-daughter
relationship, was sufficient to excuse his nonsupport and prevent it
from constituting abandonment.
Child abandonment tends to be looked on by society as a manifestation of aggravated unfitness in a parent, and it is often difficult
to be certain whether a court is relying on a finding of parental unfitness or of abandonment of the child for granting the involuntary
adoption. However, with the increase in the number of divorces,
coupled with incidental child custody awards, it must be recognized
that the abandonment of the child may not be the result of any positive
act on the part of the parent, but rather an unavoidable incident
of the newly acquired status. There is a recognized predilection of
courts in divorce proceedings to grant custody of minor children to
their natural mother. One of the strongest cases reflecting this inclination of the Florida courts is Friedman v. Friedman.3 5 Although
the mother in this case was under the care of a psychiatrist, while the
father held a Ph.D. degree and taught at a well-known university,
the court nevertheless granted an award of custody to the mother,
relying on "the established rule that ordinarily the best interests of
a young child of tender years are served by the child being placed in
34. Steets v. Gammarino, 59 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1952).
35. 100 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1958).
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the custody of his mother with reasonable privileges of visitation to
the father."'3 The mere fact that the father does not receive custody
after the divorce can certainly not be construed as a judicial determination of his unfitness as a parent. Parental unsuitability for purposes
of legal custody must be differentiated from unfitness for purposes of
involuntary adoption, since greater evidence of unfitness is required
for permanent deprivation of parental rights than for the mere award
of custody.
If the natural parent has contributed to the support of his child
or even shown a genuine interest in the well-being of his child, then
the appellate court is not likely to permit the adoption over his protest. The trial courts, on the other hand, are more willing to sever
the relationship of the parent not having custody if they feel the
child's welfare may thereby be better served. In view of a tendency
of divorced parents to make their child an unwilling pawn in the
bitter parental struggle, the attitude of the chancellors may be more
defensible from a standpoint of protecting the primary interest of
the child, even though the parent may be completely innocent of any
neglect.
CONCLUSION

Formal adoption marks the termination of all common law rights
and duties of the parent to his child, and may occur either voluntarily
by consent of the parent, or involuntarily by dictate of the state. The
right of the state as parens patriaeto encroach upon the common law
parental rights arises only if the welfare of the child demands it. The
Florida Legislature has directed explicitly that the right of legal
adoption shall be granted without the consent of the natural parents
in those circumstances in which "the best interests of the child will be
promoted . . . :,37 The dilemma of the court rests in the fact that
not enough is known concerning exactly what is the best interest of
the child. There has been an increasing tendency on the part of
the Florida courts to rely upon advice, testimony, and investigations
of social workers; however, the danger exists that these individuals
might apply the norms and standards of their own socio-economic
class to persons who 'have spent their lives in circumstances in which
other standards exist, the result being a moralistic and punitive approach to the problem by the social workers. In the desire to punish
the parent, the welfare of the child may be forgotten or overlooked.
On the other hand, the appellate courts are greatly oriented toward the protection of parental rights. Inasmuch as the chancellor
36. Id. at 169.

37.

FLA. STAT. §72.20 (1961).
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has the actual parties before him, it would appear that as to the
pure finding of fact that a particular course of action is in the best
interest of the child, the appellate court should reverse this finding
only if it is clearly contrary to the evidence. However, cases indicate
that this deference to the chancellor's findings does not always exist.
The Florida Supreme Court has indicated an unwillingness to deny
parental rights unless the conditions are flagrant and continuing.
Moreover, the common law rights are so highly regarded by the court
that past neglect of duty will not be sufficient grounds for adoption
if the natural parents at the time of the hearing are capable of and
express an intention of properly caring for the child in the future.38
Thus, although the Florida Supreme Court has announced repeatedly that the welfare of the child is the first and foremost consideration, the common law rights of parents continue to be jealously
guarded. The danger is that the parental rights will be upheld in
those circumstances in which the legislature has seen fit to declare
that they be forfeited in the best interests of society and the child.
The draftsmen of both the Uniform Adoption Act 39 and a model adoption act proposed by the Social Security Administration o believe that
the problems involved in establishing the status of the child are aggravated by the practice of determining the relative fitness of both
the natural parents and the adoptive parents in the same judicial
proceeding. The decision in the controversy involved in the termination of parental rights improperly affects the outcome of the subsequent adoption issue; a finding that the natural parents are unfit
implies that the adoptive parents are fit. Therefore, both adoption
acts require that the two issues be considered in separate judicial
proceedings, with consideration of this termination issue always preceding that of adoption. Whether separation of the proceedings is
necessary or desirable is debatable. The sole criteria for a determination of both issues must be the effect of the decision on the welfare
of the child. So long as this remains foremost in the mind of the
court, determining the final status of the child in a single adjudication
seems preferable, even though the solution may involve more than
one issue of fact.
CLYDE A. REEsE, JR.
88. See Roy v. Holmes, 111 So. 2d 468, 471 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
39. Ucrwomz ADoPTION ACT. Neither this act nor the Model Adoption Act
has been enacted in Florida.
40. U. S. DEPT. or HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADmnmSTRATION, LEGISLATIVE GuiDEs FOR THE TERmuvNATION OF PAPHNTAL BIGHTS
AND BESPONSIBILITrES AND THE ADOPTION OF CmrLDPn,
(Children's Bureau Pub.

No. 394, 1961).
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